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[1] Например, Хьюз и Ландстрем (Huse, Landsrtöm, 2002) отмечают, что смысловая составляющая термина во многом зависит от конкретной дисциплины, в рамках категориального аппарата которой он используется.
[2] Например, наличие единой корпоративной системы ценностей как защитный механизм от возникновения конфликтов интересов, наличие специфических знаний у компании-цели как причина для ее поглощения и т.д.
[3] На текущий момент термин не имеет общепринятого перевода в российском научном обороте.
[4] На текущий момент термин не имеет общепринятого перевода в российском научном обороте.
[5] На текущий момент термин не имеет общепринятого перевода в российском научном обороте.