4674: The principles of appearance in general are merely those of form, namely time.
The principium of the exposition of appearances is the ground of the exposition in general of that which is given. The exposition of that which is thought depends solely on consciousness, but the exposition of that which is given, if one regards the matter as undetermined, depends on the ground of all relation and of the concatenation of representations (sensations).
4675: Likewise I would not represent anything as outside of me and thus make appearance into experience (objectively) if the representations did not relate to something that is parallel tomyI, through which I refer them from myself to another subject. Likewise if manifold representations did not determine one another in accordance with a universal law. The three relations[1] in the mind therefore require three analogies of appearance, in order to transform the subjective functions of the mind into objective ones and thereby make them into concepts of the understanding, which give reality to the appearances.
The inner necessity of appearance, namely where it is freed from everything subjective and is regarded as determinable through a universal rule (of appearances), is that which is objective. That which is objective is the ground of the consensus of appearances among one another.
4679: An object of the senses is only that which has an effect upon my senses, hence which acts and is a substance. Hence the category of substance is fundamental. Every beginning of a state of representation is always a transition from a previous one, for otherwise we would not perceive that something has begun. Thus, since the same subject is always valid for one object as well as for the other and also the boundary is common to them, the one that succeeds belongs to the one that precedes as to that which determines it. In the unity of the mind a whole is only possible insofar as the mind determines one partial representation reciprocally from the other and all are collectively comprehended in an action that is valid for all of them.
4681: Nothing synthetic can be objectively valid except that which is the condition through which something is given as an object or through which something that was given is thought as an object. An object is only thought insofar as it stands under a rule of appearance, and the receptivity of the rule is that which makes the appearance objective; thus it is not the appearances that stand under a rule, but the objects, which are their ground. They are expounded in accordance with this rule.
R 4682: The concept of what happens is a determination of sensibility, but through the understanding, insofar as something is placed in the temporal succession. Now this cannot happen except in relation to something that precedes. Accordingly the rule that what happens is determined by something preceding it asserts nothing other than (that all of this is determinable in the order of time) that the determination of a position of something existing in time must take place through the understanding, hence in accordance with a rule.
R 4683: A synthetic proposition that holds of everything in general is false, and especially that whose subject is a pure concept. Unless it is not to hold obiective (absolutely), but only under the subjective restriction of the use of reason.
R 4684: In a synthetic judgment 2 pure concepts of reason can never stand in relation to each other, rather a pure concept of the understanding with a concept under a sensible condition, whether of appearance or of a priori representation. The cause of this.
LB B 12 (Bd. XXIII, 18) 1780
1. The unity of apperception in relation to the faculty of imagination is the understanding. Rules.
2. In relation to the reproductive faculty the unity is analytic, in relation to the productive, synthetic. The synthetic unity of apperception in relation to the transcendental faculty of imagination is the pure understanding. This transcendental faculty is that which universally determines all appearances in general with regard to time in accordance with rules that are valid a priori.
3. The three first faculties are not to be explained.
4. The transcendental synthesis of the imagination lies at the basis of all the concepts of our understanding.
5. The empirical use of the imagination rests on the synthesis of apprehension of empirical intuition which can then also be reproduced or made into another in accordance with the analogy therewith. In the latter case it is the productive imagination.
6. The productive imagination is either pure or empirical. The pure one.
7. The imagination is a synthesis, in part productive, in part reproductive. The former makes the latter possible, for ifwe have not previously brought it together through synthesis then we could not also connect with others in our subsequent state.
8. The productive imagination is (1) empirical in apprehension, (2) pure but sensible with regard to an object of pure sensible intuition, (3) transcendental with regard to an object in general. The first presupposes the second, and the second presupposes the third.
9. The pure synthesis of the imagination is the ground of the possibility of the empirical synthesis in apprehension, thus also of perception. It is possible a priori and produces nothing but shapes. The transcendental synthesis of imagination pertains only to the unity of apperception in the synthesis of the manifold in general through the imagination. Through that a concept of the object in general is conceived in accordance with the different kinds of transcendental synthesis. The synthesis happens in time.
10. All appearances concern me not insomuch as they are in the senses but as they can at least be encountered in apperception. In this, however, they can only be encountered by means of the synthesis of apprehension, i.e., of imagination, but this must agree with the absolute unity of apperception, thus all appear- ances are only elements ofa possible cognition insofar as they stand under the transcendental unity of the synthesis of imagination. Now the categories are nothing other than the representations of something (appearance) in general so far as it is represented through the transcendental synthesis of imagination, thus all appearances as elements of a possible cognition (experience) stand under the categories.
11. All intuitions are nothing for us if they cannot be taken up into consciousness. Thus their relation to possible cognition is nothing other than their relation to consciousness. But all connection ofthe manifold of intuition is nothing if it is not taken up in the unity of apperception, thus every cognition that is possible in itself belongs to a possible cognition insofar as it belongs with all other possible cognitions in relation to a single apperception.
12. The manifold, however, cannot thoroughly belong to one apperception except by means ofa thoroughgoing synthesis ofimagination and its functions in one consciousness. This transcendental unity in the synthesis of imagination is thus an a priori unity under which all appearances must stand. Those [sic] however, are the categories, thus the categories express the necessary unity of apperception under which all appearances belong insofar as they belong to a cognition a priori and necessarily.
13. It is no wonder that the understanding can prescribe to experience a priori laws that contain the conditions of all empirical ones. For through this understanding that unity is alone possible which appearance must primordi- ally have in apperceptions and through which it conjoins into one experience.
14. The understanding as the ground of all analytical unity in judgments is therefore also the ground of rules and the source of them.
15. The suspension ofthe restriction seems to be an amplification. Something and nothing, Being and non-entity. Paralogism of the power of judgment.
16. Sensibility, imagination, and apperception cannot be further explained.
17. Summary concept ofthe faculty ofpure understanding with regard to objects
18. If the objects that are given to us were things in themselves and not mere appearances then we could not have any a priori cognition ofthem at all. For if we took it from the objects, then the cognition would be empirical and not a priori, but if we would form concepts of them independently from them then this would have no relation at all to any object, thus it would be concepts without content; from this one sees that there must be appearances. Now as representations these belong to one and the same apperception and as [breaks off].
R 5636 (Bd. XVIII, 268) 1780
The quaestio facti is in what way one has first come into the possession of a concept;
The quaestio iuris is with what right one possesses and uses it.
The universality and necessity in the use of the pure concepts of the understanding betrays their origin and that it is either completely impermissible and false or else must not be empirical.
In pure sensibility, the pure power of imagination, and pure apperception lies the ground of the possibility of all empirical cognition a priori and of the synthesis in accordance with concepts, which has objective reality. For they pertain only to appearances (which are in themselves contingent and without unity), so that one properly cognizes only oneself as the thinking subject, but everything else as in this one thing.
All representations, wherever they might come from, are in the end as representations modifications of the inner sense, and it is from this viewpoint that their unity must be regarded.3 To their receptivity there corresponds a spontaneity of synthesis. Either of apprehension as sensations or of reproduction as imagesor of recognition as concepts.
Transcendental principles of mathematics (not mathematical principles), namely that all intuitions and sensations are magnitudes and that the mathematical propositions about magnitude have reality, although only as of appearances.
….
It is a very important question, whether the categories are of merely empirical or also trans. use. To the schematistic.
[1] From 4674: 1. the relation to the subject, 2. the relation of succession among one another, 3. of composition