In October 1992 the government of Mozambique signed a peace agreement with RENAMO, a South African-trained and -assisted guerrilla movement. Although RENAMO was unable to defeat the Mozambican government, it had rendered most of the country ungovernable. RENAMO’s use of terror, indiscriminate killing of civilians, press-ganging of child soldiers, and destructive capacity had earned it the appellation the “Khmer Rouge of Africa.” Upon assuming the task of implementing the peace accords, the UN, having witnessed Savimbi’s return to war in Angola and being concerned about the character of RENAMO and its leader, Afonso Dhlakama, doubted the sincerity of RENAMO’s commitment to the negotiated settlement.58
The tardy deployment of UN peacekeepers and establishment of an administrative capacity to oversee cantonment and demobilization of troops provided RENAMO and the government with an excuse to stall on their obligations under the peace treaty.59 But as the necessary UN units and personnel arrived in Mozambique and eliminated the excuse, UN Special Representative Aldo Ajello found himself stymied by the warring parties’ continuing noncooperation—especially RENAMO, which embarked on a three-month boycott of the implementation process.60
To bring RENAMO back into the fold, Ajello pursued two policies. First, the peace accord’s mediators stressed that Dhlakama, in addition to searching for security assurances, placed a high priority on the issue of legitimacy—that his movement had fought for a just cause, had domestic roots, and was not simply a puppet of South Africa—and hungered for recognition as a Mozambican nationalist who had fought for democracy. Much of RENAMO’s behavior belied such a self-image, and Dhlakama’s vision of democracy was not multiparty pluralism where parties do not return to war if they lose an election or eliminate their adversary if they win. A key task for Ajello therefore was to socialize RENAMO into the rules of democratic competition and to make its legitimacy contingent on fulfilling its commitment to peace. The subcustodians of the peace process—the representatives of the countries supporting the UN Observation Mission in Mozambique—assisted Ajello by continuously reinforcing Dhlakama’s desire for legitimacy. Leaders of neighboring countries overcame their distaste for RENAMO, met with Dhlakama, and treated him as a legitimate national leader.
Second, Ajello understood that it was crucial to wean RENAMO from its military raison d’être. To do so he fulfilled a promise that mediators
209 made to Dhlakama to provide financial assistance to RENAMO to transform it into a democratic party. Italy, Ajello’s home country, gave him a $15 million fund to assist RENAMO’s renovation. This fund, combined with the flexibility to use it in conjunction with gaining incremental compliance to the accords, gave Ajello enormous leverage with RENAMO. This leverage was amplified because of the unique context of the Mozambican case. Unlike Angola, where Savimbi bankrolled his spoiler behavior through the illegal diamond trade, or Cambodia, where the Khmer Rouge replenished its weapons and ammunition through illicit gem and timber deals, Mozambique’s paucity of accessible valuable commodities deprived RENAMO of resources if it chose to reject peace.
Although Ajello’s use of inducements kept RENAMO engaged in the peace process, it also encouraged Dhlakama to continue voicing grievances and making demands on the UN. Ajello resolved several incidents involving cantonment and demobilization by acceding to RENAMO demands that were not contained in the peace accords.61 Eventually, Ajello grew frustrated with RENAMO’s tactics and threatened withdrawal. Ajello used a visit by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali to Mozambique in October 1993 to convince RENAMO that continuation of the peace process was conditional on RENAMO meeting its obligations. The withdrawal threat yielded short-term results; RENAMO pledged anew its commitment to peace, and UN officials reported progress on implementing key provisions of the agreement.
Ajello discovered, however, that the closer the peace process came to the election in October 1994, the more the UN’s threat of withdrawal declined in credibility. Having spent $800 million on the peace process, the UN could not convince RENAMO of its pledge to walk away without at least holding elections.62 Ajello therefore relied increasingly on inducement, even though the risk of whetting Dhlakama’s appetite grew more dangerous as the elections drew near. What would happen, for example, if RENAMO lost the elections and demanded that the results be annulled in the hope of being rewarded for its obstructionist behavior?
The UN had sought to make the actions of a postelection spoiler irrelevant by fully demobilizing both armies and creating a new unified army. Demobilization, however, was incomplete; both RENAMO and the government had armies at the time of the elections in October 1994. Neither side, however, had anything close to the amount of troops wielded by the parties in Angola in October 1992; RENAMO and the government had several thousand troops held in reserve.63 If the loser decided to defect from the peace process, it would still possess a destructive capacity but not a force capable of winning the civil war in a short period.
Given the UN and U.S. experience of Savimbi’s overturn of the elections in Angola in 1992, as well as the use of violence by the SOC to
210 blackmail UNTAC after the Cambodian elections, it is remarkable that as late as June 1994, four months before the Mozambican elections, neither the UN nor the U.S. embassy in Maputo had contingency plans in case the loser of the election rejected the results.64 Instead of thinking strategically about the possibility, the United States unsuccessfully urged the parties to consider a power-sharing pact that would establish a South African-style government of national unity after the election. On the other hand, the governments of states in the region, very much chastened by the experience of Savimbi in 1992, began consultations on responses if Dhlakama rejected the results.
RENAMO did attempt to boycott the elections and reject the results. Because the United Nations had not set a limit on how far inducement would go, diplomats from the neighboring countries of Zimbabwe and South Africa had to meet with Dhlakama and warn in no uncertain terms that they would not accept any obstruction of the elections. The UN and United States followed the warning with both an appeal to Dhlakama’s desire to be a legitimate national actor and democrat and a promise to investigate any alleged electoral fraud. RENAMO rejoined the elections, withdrew its charges of fraud, and took its seats in the newly elected Mozambican parliament.