In May 1991 the two main antagonists in the Angolan civil war, the government of Angola and UNITA, signed a peace agreement in BicesseЛиссабон, Portugal. The agreement, mediated by Portugal, the United States, and the Soviet Union, called for an 18-month transition period during which each party would canton расквартированный its troops, demobilize some of them, and then join the remainder in a unified Angolan army. At the end of this period, elections would determine the presidency and composition of a national assembly. The agreement contained no provisions for power sharing, nor was there a provision for the election’s loser to receive a share of ministerial portfolios or provincial governorships in the highly centralized state structure. Although each party had been urged имели to consider various power-sharing options, both vetoed налагать вето them in the belief that they would win the elections.
The government of Angola reluctantly неохотно accepted a role for the UN to monitor наблюдение and assist implementation of the peace agreement. The role and size of the UN presence were the result of hard bargaining between UNITA, which wanted a large UN force with an active mandate to implement the agreement, and the government of Angola, which perceived a large UN presence as an infringement посягательство (на права, on its sovereignty.
The UN operation in Angola was done on a small budget with little independent latitude. The parties themselves were left to carry out the demobilization, and they failed. By May 1992 about 70 percent of the estimated 160,000 soldiers had been processed at assembly points находились на сборных пунктах, but only 6,000 had been demobilized. By the elections on September 29–30, substantially more government troops had demobilized than had UNITA soldiers; nonetheless, both sides had intactюое боеспобные armies. Between January and September 1992 there were numerous violations of the cease-fire, with UN monitors estimating that at least 16 skirmishes инциденты could have escalated into major combat between the parties.53 That they did not was attributed to the parties’ determination to see the process through to elections and their command and control over their armed forces.
Until late summer 1992 the United States and the United Nations
205 were more apprehensive испытывающий тревогу about the Angolan government’s willingness to abide следовать by the peace process than they were about UNITA’s. The biggest worry for U.S. policy makers regarding Angola was that the government might not accept an electoral defeat and would throw the peace process into crisis.54 Nonetheless, UNITA’s president, Jonas Savimbi, provided signs that he might be the obstacle to ending the war. Under cover of the agreement, UNITA stationed soldiers throughout the country—especially in areas it had previously not engaged—and cached arms for quick access быстро доступные склады оружия. In addition, rumors молва.слухиsuggested that UNITA was holding back armed battalions across the Zaire border. A top Savimbi aide помощник; консультант, советник defected and informed the United States of a plan for a quick strike offensive to take the country by force.
The transition period had upset нарушен the balance of power between the two militaries. The cantonment расквартирование (войск) process had worked decisively in UNITA’s favor; UNITA’s army maintained its discipline and remained a unified force that could be mobilized quickly for fighting purposes. The government’s army, on the other hand, suffered from poor morale; desertion дезертирство и пъянство and drunkenness were rife. Savimbi’s generals informed him that Angola could be taken by a military surprise attack внезапное нападение —a sentiment настроение that Savimbi relayed to officials in Washington in August, two months before the elections.55
As elections drew near, U.S. policy makers grew alarmed рост обеспокоенности about Savimbi’s potential as a spoiler. Reports circulated that his standing among Angolan voters was declining, raising the possibility that Savimbi would lose the election. Then-Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Herman Cohen and his Portuguese counterpart traveled to Angola at the beginning of September to persuade Savimbi and President Eduardo dos Santos to share power after the elections. While Savimbi responded enthusiastically to the plan, dos Santos privately expressed interest but felt he could not publicly commit to such a deal. In the end no contingency plan was formed in case Savimbi lost the election.
The elections were peaceful. The UN took multiple intricate precautions меры предосторожности to prevent fraud обман; мошенничество: representatives of the competing parties were present at the 5,800 polling stations избирательные участки and at every municipal, provincial, and national electoral center уровнях. Party representatives signed off on results sheets at each level на каждом уровне представители партии пописывали результаты подсчета голосов, что увеличивало сроки выборов a process that added days to the vote counting. There were numerous logistical foul-ups трудности с подсчётом голосов, но международные наблюдатели признали выборы в целом свободными и справедливыми, but international observers judged the elections to be free from intimidation and fraud. The results jibed with the UN electoral unit’s quick count экзеполы, thus confirming that fraud did not occur.56 In the legislative elections парламентские the ruling Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola (MPLA) outpolled UNITA by a margin of five to three. Dos Santos received about 49.5 percent to Savimbi’s 40 percent for the presidency; as no candidate received 50 percent of the vote, a runoff election итоговые would have to be held in 30 days.
206 Problems emerged as soon as the preliminary results предварительный результат were reported. The first results came from Luanda, an MPLA stronghold оплот; not surprisingly, they showed the MPLA and dos Santos with a large majority. Savimbi and UNITA immediately cried foul and issued a bombastic five-page memo (in English) declaring that the MPLA was engaged in massive fraudобвинила МПЛА в массовой подтасовке and warning in veiled terms недвусмысленно предупредил о возобновлении гражданской войны that UNITA would resume the war if it lost the election. When returns from the central provinces (UNITA’s stronghold оплот) did not offset MPLA’s early lead результаты выборов в провинциях, поддерживающих УНИТА не опровергли общую победу МПЛА, UNITA withdrew its generals from the joint command of the newly established united Angolan army. Savimbi retreated to a redoubtотшел от мирного процесса, refused to meet any foreign officials or take a phone callтелефонные переговоры from Cohen, denounced обвинил ООН the UN, and repeatedly ignored international calls for reasonableness корректность, разумность. His army then launched attacks throughout the Angolan countryside, quickly seizing large amounts of territory and destroying government arms depots военные базы.
The international response to Savimbi was scattershot бессистемный. The UN at first insisted on the primacy of the elections and condemned Savimbi for obstructing препятствовать them. The United States initially urged убеждать Savimbi to use the established mechanisms for investigating his electoral grievances жалобы, making its appeal over Voice of America because Savimbi would not speak with U.S. officials. As the UN attempted to press Savimbi to honor the election results and participate in a presidential runoff участвовать в выборах президента во втором туре election, South Africa’s foreign minister, Pik Botha, visited Savimbi and unilaterally put forward a plan to shelve отложить на неопределенное время new elections and to provide for a government of national unity. Policy makers in Washington quickly chose a similar option: to press the MPLA into a power-sharing agreement to appease успокаивать; умиротворять Savimbi.
The U.S. response established the international strategy toward Savimbi. By initially equivocating, the United States failed to challenge him; then by interpreting his actions as understandable and reasonable, it chose a strategy of inducement, which served only to encourage further aggression. Savimbi continued his attempts to defeat the Angolan government and to avoid serious negotiations. A year later, in November 1993, Savimbi returned to negotiations, but only after the rearmed Angolan military had rolled back UNITA’s gains, the United States had granted diplomatic recognition to the Angolan government, the UN had imposed sanctions against UNITA, and 300,000 Angolans had died.
Washington’s strategy of inducement toward Savimbi was disputed by U.S. officials in Angola, including Ambassador-designate кандидат на пост посла Edmund De Jarnette. From the beginning of the crisis he and others stationed in Luanda diagnosed the problem as stemming from Savimbi’s personality and ambitions. They believed he was motivated by a desire to win complete power in Angola. These officials counseled советовали giving Savimbi an ultimatum to return to the peace process, backed by a threat to use U.S.
207 military force. From the onset of the crisis through 1993, De Jarnette argued that an inducement strategy toward Savimbi would fail.
U.S. officials in Washington, however, believed that Savimbi did not want to overturn разрушить the peace process but simply wanted a better deal больше преимуществ. Long-standing ties between Savimbi and the Defense Department Министерство обороны США and intelligence agencies were part of the problem; individuals who knew Savimbi and had been дружеские by him could not bring themselves to find him at fault не видели его недостатков. Likewise, negotiators who had worked hard to get an agreement could not believe that one of the signatories доверенное лицо was rejecting a compromise solution outright совершенно. And those in Washington who were swayed сомневались by the analysis of the U.S. diplomats in Luanda were stymied сдерживало by the tight connections between Savimbi’s Washington lobbyists and the Bush administration.
A top U.S. policy maker admitted признали in retrospect that the strategy of inducement toward Savimbi was “clutching at straws” хвататься за соломинку =ненадежность= but insisted that невозможность жесткой политики a tougher policy was out of the question.57 The Bush administration was preoccupied with the November 1992 presidential election and then with the humanitarian crisis and intervention in Somalia in December. Moreover, Savimbi’s Washington connections precluded исключала any use of coercion. Inducement failed in Angola because U.S. policy makers erroneously ошибочно believed that limited incentives стимулы would satisfy Savimbi. Furthermore, they were not prepared when inducement emboldened окажуьтя побуждающее воздействие Savimbi to continue his spoiler behavior. In part, Savimbi’s personality defined the conflict in all-or-nothing terms; a combination of racism, paranoia, and megalomania мания величия led him to believe that the MPLA had stolen украсть the election from him and that he had the right to rule all of Angola. In October 1992, at the time that he rejected the elections, anything less than an absolute firm stand against his pursuit of war and a credible реальная threat of force and sanctions against UNITA had little chance of persuading Savimbi to return to the peace process. The initial choice of inducement convinced Savimbi that the international community would likely defer уступать to his return to war. Inducement proved доказательство that the U.S. and South African governments saw Savimbi’s demands and actions as legitimate. There was little international support for rallying behind the sanctity святости of the Bicesse peace process.
The change in power positions of the MPLA and UNITA also worked against the inducement strategy. By October 1992 the peace process had greatly strengthened UNITA; Savimbi was confident уверен that UNITA could win the war, and he underestimated the resolve решительность и боеспособность and capability of the MPLA to fight. If Savimbi had been militarily weak in October 1992 and the international community held a monopoly on rewards, inducement might have brought him back назад в мирный процесс into the fold. Savimbi, however, continued to have uninterrupted постоянные sources of revenue through UNITA’s control of diamond mines алмазные рудники and support from some of his neighbors—Mobutu in
208 Zaire and rogue elements продажных военных чиновников in the South African defense forces—who would continue to supply him with arms, ammunition, and fuel горючееto fight the war.